Jennifer Thompson meets with Ronald Cotton,
the man she erroneously accused of raping her.

RETHINKING
RELIANCE

ON EYEWITNESS
CONFIDENCE
AP PHOTO/CHUCK BURTON

by NEIL VIDMAR, JAMES E. COLEMAN, JR., and THERESA A. NEWMAN

W

mately proved to be erroneous.2 This should not be surhen Jennifer Thompson picked Ronald Cotton—suspect number five—from a line-up, she prising. In 1937 John Wigmore drew attention to the many
was “absolutely certain” she had identified the problems of eyewitness identification in The Science of Judiman who raped her in July 1984. She said she knew that
cial Proof.3 Reliance on an eyewitness’s confidence misdishe was right because, durrects law enforcement
ing the rape, she had stud- Is it time for the Supreme Court to yield officials, inappropriately
ied his eyes, his voice, his
bolsters the confidence of
to solid science and overturn
height, and even the shape
other witnesses, negates
of his ears. She was deter- Biggers’ reliance on the “common sense” credible exculpatory evimined to identify him later
dence, and contributes to
confidence criterion?
if she survived. Thompthe over-reliance on eyewitson’s repeated strong and
ness testimony by jurors and
confident identification of Cotton during pretrial promany judges. A major difficulty is that frequently judges
ceedings and at trial led to his 1985 conviction and senfeel their hands are tied by a legal precedent that has contence of life imprisonment plus 50 years.
tinued to vex courts across the country.
In 1995, DNA evidence proved Thompson’s identification to be wrong. She erred because her memory of the Origins of a precedent
rapist was skewed by suggestive pretrial identification A trilogy of cases under U.S. v. Wade, decided in 1967,
procedures: working with police on a composite sketch of
also recognized the frailties of eyewitness identification.
the suspect inclined her to identify Cotton’s mug shot,
The foundation of the trilogy was the Wade Court’s
which bore a resemblance to her assailant; selecting his acknowledgment of the “high incidence of miscarriage of
mug shot primed her to pick him out of a line-up; and
justice” caused by mistaken eyewitness identifications,
picking him out of the line-up led her to identify him
with absolute certainty at trial. Investigators’ positive
1. CBS’s 60 minutes gives many of the details of the case plus commentary by
reactions to her repeated identification of Cotton further highly
regarded researchers on the underlying science bearing on eyewitness
reinforced Thompson’s misguided certainty that he was identification http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/03/06/60minutes/
main4848039.shtml.) Or see the New York Times best seller, Jennifer
her rapist.1
Thompson-Cannino and Ronald Cotton, with Erin Torrino, PICKING COTTON:
The Ronald Cotton story is far from unique in its tale of OUR MEMOIR OF INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
unreliable eyewitness confidence and the inaccuracy of an 2009).
2. The Innocence Project, Understand the Causes: Eyewitness Identification,
identification leading to a wrongful conviction. Of the 239 available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/EyewitnessDNA exonerations documented by late 2009, 73 percent— Misidentification.php
3. John H. Wigmore, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF (3d ed. 1937) at Part
or 175 cases—involved positive eyewitness testimony—ulti- III, pp. 499-632.
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and its recognition that suggestive
pretrial identifications can taint later
identifications. 4 The Court held that
where there has been a suggestive
pretrial identification, any subsequent in-court identification must
have an independent basis to be
admissible. In applying this test, the
Court suggested several factors that
may be considered:
for example, the prior opportunity to
observe the alleged criminal act, the
existence of any discrepancy between
any pre-lineup description and the
defendant’s actual description, any
identification prior to lineup of
another person, the identification by
picture of the defendant prior to the
lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse
of time between the alleged act and the
lineup identification.

ness certainty or confidence, warning that an eyewitness “may be subjected to so many suggestive
influences by the police that at the
trial he will make ‘a positive identification which no amount of subjective cross-examination will be able to
shake.’” Thus, the introduction of
confidence as a factor in Biggers conflicted with the very foundation of
Wade: the recognition that an eyewitness is unlikely to “go back on his
word” once he has identified the
defendant.

No scientific basis

However, when the Supreme Court
returned to the subject in the 1972
case of Neil v. Biggers, it restated the
factors, adding a new one—“the level
of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation.”5 This new
factor appears to have been the product of the Bigger Court’s “common
sense” intuition rather than being
based on Wade, any other Court
precedent, or, indeed, on any empirical evidence.
While the Wade Court did not
attribute its list of reliability factors
to any source, the factors appear to
have originated in a book by Patrick
M. Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in
Criminal Cases,6 which the Court referenced repeatedly throughout its
opinion. Strikingly, however, Wall
cautioned against the use of eyewit-

In the nearly four decades since Biggers, peer-reviewed journals have
published hundreds of scientific
studies on the accuracy of eyewitness
identification. These studies confirm
what Wall had concluded in 1965:
that the correlation between eyewitness confidence and accuracy is at
best a weak relationship and is contingent on any number of situational
factors, some of which can be manipulated, even unintentionally, by
police or other witnesses.7
Professor Gary Wells, one of the
leading experts on eyewitness identification, and co-author Deah Quinlivan, recently published an extensive
review of 30 years of eyewitness identification research, showing that the
confidence factor is central in
explaining unreliability.8
Research also shows that the relationship between confidence and
accuracy is alterable in predictable
ways by the investigation and trial
process. Nancy Steblay, for example,

4. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228
(1967).
5. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).
6. Patrick M. Wall, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION
IN CRIMINAL CASES 90–130 (1965) (listing 12 “danger factors” of eyewitness identification).
7. See, e.g., Saul M. Kassin et. al., On the “General
Acceptance” of Eyewitness Testimony Research, 56 AM.
PSYCH. 405, 407–12 (2001) (reporting that 87% of
scientists surveyed believed it was proper to offer
expert testimony at trial that “an eyewitness’s confidence is not a good predictor of . . . accuracy”).
8. Gary L. Wells & Deah H. Quinlivan, Suggestive
Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the Supreme
Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science:
30 Years Later, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1–24 (2009);
see also Siegfried Sporer, et al., Choosing, Confidence,
and Accuracy: A Meta-Analysis of the Confidence-Accuracy Relation in Eyewitness Identification Studies, 118
PSYCH. BULL. 315-27 (1995) (similarly analyzing 30
studies, demonstrating a low relationship

between confidence and accuracy).
9. Nancy Mehrkens Steblay, Social Influence on
Eyewitness Recall: A Meta-Analytic Review of Lineup
Instruction Effects, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 283–97
(1997).
10. Gerald Odinot et al., Eyewitness memory of a
supermarket robbery: A case study of accuracy and confidence after 3 months, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV 506514 (2009).
11. Id at 513.
12. See John S. Shaw III, Tana K. Zerr & Keith A.
Woythaler, Public Eyewitness Confidence Ratings Can
Differ From Those Held Privately, 25 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 141 (2001).
13. John S. Shaw III, Increases in Eyewitness Confidence Resulting from Postevent Questioning, 2 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: APPLIED 126 (1996);
John S. Shaw III & Kimberly A. McClure, Repeated
Postevent Questioning Can Lead to Elevated Levels of
Eyewitness Confidence, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 629
(1996).

demonstrated the consistency of the
finding that—as with Jennifer
Thompson in the Ronald Cotton
case—eyewitnesses’ confidence is
affected by feedback from the police
or other witnesses.9 This simple “confirmatory feedback” tends to produce robust effects on eyewitnesses’
assessment of the observed event,
including exaggerated reporting of
their confidence in the identification, the attention they paid to the
suspect, and even the length of time
that they viewed the suspect. Thus,
because of the occurrence of confirmatory feedback over the course of
an investigation, the relationship
between confidence and accuracy is
likely to get weaker, rather than
stronger, before trial.
In a recently published study
involving 14 witnesses to an actual
armed robbery, the findings again
supported the general scientific conclusion that witness confidence is not
a reliable predictor of accuracy of
recall.10 In that study, the witness’s
recollections were checked against
store video cameras that recorded
the entire event. While about 84 percent of the information the witnesses
recalled was correct, the accuracyconfidence correlation was “modest,” prompting the authors to
caution that while “confidence may
be used as a cautious indicator for
accuracy during police investigations
. . . , it should never be allowed as evidence for memory accuracy in the
courtroom.”11
Multiple studies have also consistently failed to find ways to improve
this relationship. For example,
although collaborating with another
witness has been found to be associated with higher confidence as well as
higher accuracy, the relationship has
been found to be lower when
responses were made in public, which
of course is necessary in this context.12
Even repeated questioning, without any confirmatory feedback, can
lead to higher reported confidence
over time.13 Thus, if an eyewitness is
asked several times over an extended
period to confirm an identification
she has made, her confidence in the
accuracy of her identification is
www.ajs.org JUDICATURE
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greater at the end of the period than
it was at the beginning. Additionally,
in situations where social pressures
or incentives to perform correctly
are high – such as in a trial setting –
eyewitnesses try especially hard to
“get it right.”14
In short, over the last 30 years,
research has convincingly established
that the “common sense” Biggers confidence factor is generally unsuitable
for determining the reliability of eyewitness testimony. Under conditions
specific to a trial, confidence is likely
to be an even less reliable predictor
of accuracy.

Contaminating
criminal proceedings
As the Court was aware in Wade, considering confidence as a factor in
determining the reliability of eyewitness testimony can adversely affect
the investigation, pretrial, trial, and
appellate stages of a criminal case. At
the investigation and pretrial stages,
the factor shapes decisions about
whom or what to investigate and
whether to prosecute. Whenever an
identification is made, police routinely are instructed to document the
confidence level of the eyewitness. If
the witness expresses some degree of
uncertainty about what she witnessed,
the police may redouble their efforts
to develop additional evidence of the
suspect’s guilt or may abandon some
avenues of investigation; if the witness
expresses a high degree of certainty,
the police more often will curtail their
investigation or thereafter focus
entirely on the suspect identified.15 In
both cases, the police may be inappropriately narrowing the investigations, because they are assuming,
contrary to scientific fact, that certainty equates with accuracy. Such
misdirected investigations frequently
lead to wrongful convictions.
Prosecutors are also subject to this
kind of misdirection. For example,
in cases that depend heavily upon
the testimony of an eyewitness, prosecutors may decide not to charge
the actual perpetrator because an
eyewitness cannot express sufficient
confidence in the identification.
Conversely, a prosecutor may pursue
18

a case primarily because of the eyewitness’s certainty about an identification and ignore other evidence
that raises doubt.
At the trial stage, courts often
appear to favor the testimony of
highly certain eyewitnesses, in the
process subtly encouraging witnesses
to express greater confidence so
their testimony will be admitted and
they will not disappoint the prosecutors, the police, even the victims of
the crimes. Jurors also tend to give
more weight to eyewitness testimony
than is justified, particularly focusing
on the confidence with which the
eyewitness identifies the defendant.
Similarly, based on the same false
assumptions, some judges deny
motions to allow expert witnesses or
refuse to issue cautionary jury
instructions about eyewitness identifications. They reason, as the Supreme
Court did in Biggers, that lay jurors
can intuitively assess the reliability of
eyewitness testimony. Part of this reasoning is based on the assumption
that judicial instructions alone will
sensitize jurors to the problems of
eyewitness identification, including
the eyewitness’ confidence, but
empirical research indicates that
such instructions are likely to be ineffective.16 Finally, the presence of a
highly confident eyewitness may lead
experts and other witnesses to testify
more confidently, themselves, fortified by the eyewitness’ confidence.

what Biggers requires and what is scientifically sound. Some courts have
circumvented the flawed standard
altogether by addressing the problem
of eyewitness testimony under standards based on their own state constitutions. For example, courts in
Massachusetts, New York, and Wisconsin have relied upon their state
constitutions to adopt per se rules
that exclude all eyewitness testimony
obtained using unnecessarily suggestive procedures. Additionally, courts
in Michigan and Utah have adopted
tests under their constitutions that
specifically exclude the consideration
of the confidence factor.
Other courts have sought to blunt
the impact of eyewitness testimony
admitted under the standard by permitting experts to testify about the
scientifically demonstrated unreliability of such testimony.17 For example, in a case involving suggestive
pretrial procedures and the testimony of two confident eyewitnesses,
the Arizona Supreme Court ruled
that the trial court erred in refusing
to permit expert testimony on eyewitness identification, reasoning that
Dr. Loftus’ testimony and some experimental data indicate that there is no
relationship between the confidence
which a witness has in his or her identification and the actual accuracy of that
identification. . . . We cannot assume
that the average juror would be aware
of the variables concerning identification and memory about which Dr. Loftus was qualified to testify.18

The problem for courts
Although many appellate courts
unquestioningly apply the Biggers factors, others have long been struggling to reconcile the chasm between

Other appellate courts simply
downplay the confidence factor in
affirming a conviction, reasoning
that an eyewitness’s confidence is

14. John Shaw & Tana Zerr, Extra Effort During
Memory Retrieval May Be Associated With Increases in
Eyewitness Confidence, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 315
(2003).
15. See, e.g., MURDER ON A SUNDAY MORNING
(Centre National de la Cinématographie 2001)
(illustrating a documentary example of this phenomenon from Jacksonville, FL, in which the
police ended their investigation only a few hours
after the homicide once the eyewitness husband
confidently but erroneously identified sixteen
year-old Brenton Butler as his wife’s killer).
16. See Brian L. Cutler & Steven D. Penrod,MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 255–264 (1995)
17. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Santoli, 680
N.E.2d 1116, 1121 (Mass. 1997) (citing the “significant doubt about whether there is any correlation

between a witness’s confidence in his or her identification and the accuracy of her recollection”);
see also United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306 (6th
Cir. 2000); United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308
(5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d
1224 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Amaral, 488
F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hines,
55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999); People v.
McDonald, 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984); Reed v. State,
687 N.E.2d 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); Weatherred
v. State, 963 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. App. 1998).
18. State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208, 1221 (Ariz.
1983); see also United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095,
1118 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J., concurring)
(“Jurors who think they understand how memory
works may be mistaken, and if these mistakes
influence their evaluation of testimony then they
may convict innocent persons.”).
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tific and less suggestive techniques for
conducting lineups
and
photospreads.
Still other jurisdictions, including Wisconsin, have enacted
or are considering
enacting laws that
standardize scientifically validated identification procedures.19

The precedent
perseveres
Litigants in both federal and state courts
have challenged identifications as violations
of due process. Many
have petitioned the
U.S. Supreme Court
for review, but the
Court
routinely
Whenever an identification is made, police
refuses to hear chalroutinely are instructed to document the
lenges to the Biggers
confidence level of the eyewitness.
test. In one such case,
Ledbetter v. Connecticut,
influenced by the suggestive proce- the Connecticut Supreme Court
dure itself. That is, unlike the other
upheld use of the Biggers confidence
four elements of the Biggers test, the
factor while simultaneously recognizeyewitness’s degree of certainty can ing that it was contrary to scientific
be recorded only after the suggestive research.20 Ledbetter petitioned the
procedure has been used. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari
degree of certainty can be “engen- review, and an amicus brief signed by
dered by the suggestive element 21 leading experts in the field was
itself.”
submitted on his behalf.21 Among
Still other jurisdictions have tried
other things, the brief drew attention
to address the problem outside the
to the large body of scientific
courts. For example, the U.S.
research that directly challenges the
Department of Justice and Illinois,
confidence factor.
New Jersey, North Carolina, and
The Court rejected Ledbetter’s
Texas created commissions that rec- petition in 2006, and other such
ommended adoption of more scienchallenges since then. The result is
that a flawed standard continues to
privilege a factor of reliability that
19. WIS. STAT. § 175.50 (2009); see also N.C. GEN.
science and experience counsel
STAT. § 15A-284.52 (2009).
should be abandoned. At the same
20. Ledbetter v. Connecticut, 275 Conn. 534
(2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1082 (2006).
time, challenges to the confidence
21. See Brief of Neil Vidmar et. al. as Amici
factor continue unabated in state
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Ledbetter v. Connecticut, 547 U.S. 1082 (2006) (No. 05-9500),
and federal courts.22
2006 WL 869895.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408
(D.C. Cir. 2007); State v. Marquez, 967 A.2d 56
(Conn. 2009); State v. Mitchell, 200 P.3d 503
(Kan. Ct. App. 2009) (unpublished table decision); Benn v. U.S., No. 03-CF-946, 2009 WL
2778266 (D.C. Sept. 3, 2009); People v.
Rodriguez, 901 N.E.2d 927 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
23. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S.
393, 407–08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).

Time for science to prevail?
When it was adopted by the Supreme
Court in 1972, the Biggers confidence
factor was based upon widely shared
“common sense” beliefs and understandings about a direct relationship

between the confidence of an eyewitness and the accuracy of his or her
identification. Without the benefit of
scientific research, the Court thus
fashioned a constitutional standard
that comported with an intuitive
understanding generally shared by
judges, lawyers, and the general public. The common sense origin of the
decision’s confidence factor likely
accounts for both its longevity and its
power to do great harm. The decision may have seemed to make sense
at the time, but experience and scientific research have now shown that
it was wrong.
More than 75 years ago, Justice
Brandeis noted that in “cases involving the Federal Constitution, . . .
[t]he Court bows to the lessons of
experience and the force of better
reasoning, recognizing that the
process of trial and error, so fruitful in
the physical sciences, is appropriate
also in the judicial function.”23 Is it
time for the Supreme Court to finally
yield to judicial concern backed by
solid science and overturn the confidence criterion in Biggers? g
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